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The last thirty years saw dramatic increases in the employment rates of married/co-habiting mothers in 
the UK. Yet the employment rates of lone mothers were lower in the early 1990s than in the late 1970s, 
at just under 40 percent; and 25 percentage points lower than those of married mothers. In 1997 the 
incoming Labour government initiated a series of policy reforms aimed at reducing child poverty. A 
key element of their strategy was a move towards increasing employment rates among families with 
children.  
This paper evaluates how this package of policy reform impacted on lone parents employment. We use 
propensity score matching to construct a benchmark sample and then apply difference-in-difference 
estimation techniques to assess what would have happened to lone parents employment in the absence 
of policy reform. Our results show that, of the 11-percentage point rise in the rate of employment of 
lone parents between 1992 and 2002, 5-percentage points can be attribute to policy reform. This 
increase in employment occurred in-spite of significant rises in the level of support for non-working 
lone parents claiming Income Support.  This is in sharp contrast to the experience of the USA, where 
welfare generosity did not increase and time limits and mandatory job search were employed alongside 
tax credits to get lone parents back to work. In the UK, further substantive policy changes are currently 
being phased in and so it is probable that there will be further employment gains for lone parents over 
the next few years. Even so, the pace of response to these reforms does not yet look sufficient to meet 
the Government’s target of getting 70 percent of lone parents into work by 2010. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last thirty years the employment of married/co-habiting mothers in the UK 
rose dramatically, especially for those with young children (see Gregg et al. 2002, for 
a recent discussion). Yet the employment rate of lone mothers was lower in the early 
1990s than it was in the late 1970s, at just under 40 percent; and 25 percentage point 
lower than the employment rates of married mothers
1.  The UK is almost alone among 
OECD countries in having employment rates for lone mothers so far below those of 
other mothers and in some countries, such as Spain, employment is substantially 
higher among single mothers than married mothers. These very low employment rates 
have contributed towards the UK having the highest proportion of children living in 
workless households in OECD countries in 1996, and one of the highest incidences of 
child poverty (see OECD, 1998, and Micklewright 2000).  
  The incoming Labour government in 1997 initiated a series of policy reforms 
aimed at reducing child poverty A key  element of this was the move to increase 
employment rates among families with children, especially among lone parents. In N. 
America in the 1990s there had been a number of experimental welfare-to-work 
programmes aimed at raising employment among lone mothers. The Canadian Self-
Sufficiency Project (CSSP), the Minnesota Family Investment Programme, the 
Milwaukee New Hope project and the California GAIN programme provided much of 
the inspiration behind the governments chosen strategy. The result was a twin track 
approach using the newly introduced Working Families Tax Credit to improve 
financial incentives and the New Deal for Lone Parents and Job Centre Plus to 
introduce active case management into the welfare system, in order to encourage and 
support single parents to move back to work. The reforms have two targets: to raise 
employment of lone parents to 70 percent by 2010 and to reduce child poverty 
(defined in terms of relative income) by a quarter by 2005. Although the package of 
reforms introduced was largely modelled on policy experiments that had taken place 
in the US and Canada, the design was radically different from the welfare reforms 
seen in the US after 1996. In the UK the generosity of in and out-of-work benefits 
were both increased substantially for families with children, there has been no use of 
time limits for welfare payments to lone parents and participation in job search, and 
training or other support programmes has remained voluntary. The only compulsion is 
to attend interviews at the Job Centre to discuss work options. Thus, unlike in the US   2
where in-work benefits were introduced with the primary objective of welfare 
caseload reduction, in Britain the dominant policy aim has been to raise incomes for 
lone parents both in and out of work, with an increased earnings contribution being an 
important component of the intended income gains. Improving the level of financial 
support for low-paid lone parents has also been politically popular: in 2000 70 percent 
of those interviewed in the 2000 British Social Attitudes Survey supported the 
government topping up the wages of low paid lone parents, while 74 percent thought 
lone parents should face sanctions if they did not go to the Job Centre. 
  The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of policy change on lone parents 
employment rates, earnings and hours of work. While we document changes in 
employment and in the policy environment from the late 1970s onwards, our main 
focus is on changes that have occurred since 1998 when the first stages of the new 
policy regime started to come into effect. We show that while lone parents’ 
employment had begun to stage a recovery in the early 1990s, since 1998 the rate of 
recovery accelerated such that by Spring 2002 the employment rate stood 11 
percentage points higher than in 1992, at 53%
2. The second half of the 1990s were 
however a period of rapid employment growth among the population as a whole. In 
order to assess the impact of policy change on lone parents employment we therefore 
need to strip out the effects of changes in the composition of lone parents and of the 
economic cycle on employment. As we do not have a random assignment experiment, 
we use propensity score matching to build a counterfactual sample and then use 
difference-in-difference techniques to assess the policy impact. We find that policy 
changes that took place prior to 1997 had a minimal impact on lone parents 
employment. However, the more substantial package of support for working single 
parents introduced in 1998 has had a marked effect on employment, and this is in 
spite of increased support for those lone parents who choose to stay at home. Our 
results suggest that changes in policy have led to an increase in lone parents 
employment of around five percentage points (or 80,000). In addition hours of work 
have increased among those lone parents in work, with fewer lone parents working 
less than 16 hours (the critical value for eligibility for WFTC) and more at 16+ hours.   
So the share of all lone parents working 16 hours or more a week has risen by 7 
percentage points.  
                                                                                                                                            
1 Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2001   3
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II we look at trends in 
lone parents employment over the last thirty years. Section III then reviews evidence 
from the US and Canada on the impact that welfare reform  has had on lone parents 
employment, and describes recent policy changes in the UK. In Section IV we look at 
what has happened to lone parents welfare receipts and caseloads since the 1970s. In 
Section V we then describe our data and methodology while Section VI presents 
results for two periods, 1979-92 and 1992-2002. In VII we then go on to look at how 
hours of work, wages and poverty rates have responded to this growth in lone parents 
employment. Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. Background 
The low rates of employment among single mothers in the UK relative to other 
countries are well documented (see OECD 2001, Bradshaw 1996 or Millar 2001).  
Figure 1 reports lone parents’ employment rates among OECD countries
3. This 
clearly shows that only Ireland, Poland and Australia have lower rates of employment 
of single mothers than the UK. While the employment rate was around 40 percent in 
the UK in 1999, in countries including the US, Canada, Italy, Sweden, Finland and 
Portugal employment rates were at above 65 percent.  Figure 2, contrasts the 
employment rates of single mothers with both those of married mothers and single 
childless women within each country. In both cases the gap in employment for lone 
parents and other women is greater than in any other OECD country. A comparison 
between single and married mothers employment rates shows that the UK has an 
employment gap of 24 percentage points. In contrast, in around half the countries for 
which data is available single parents are more likely to work than married women; in 
the US employment rates were around 8 percentage points higher for single mothers 
than married mothers, while in Italy and Spain employment rates are more than 20 
percentage points higher.  
This employment gap has not always existed: in the late 1970s employment 
rates of lone parents and married mothers were broadly similar. However over the last 
thirty years married mothers employment has increased rapidly, while over the same 
time those for lone parents have fallen. Figure 3 uses data from the General 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Source: Labour Force Survey. 
3 Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2001   4
Household Survey (GHS) and Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS)
 4 to show how 
employment rates have changed for single and married mothers, and single childless 
women, between the late 1970s and 2002. Married mothers employment rates were 
only marginally  higher that those of lone parents in the late 1970s. However, while 
employment rates of lone parents fell and then stagnated in the 1980s, for married 
mothers employment rates grew steadily from around 1984 so that by the mid-1990s 
employment rates of single childless women and married mothers were broadly 
similar. This divergence in the experiences of single and married mothers meant that 
by the early 1990s a gulf in the employment rates of single and married mothers had 
emerged, which has only recently begun to narrow. Since 1992, the employment rate 
of lone parents rose, from 42% to 53% in 2002 (see Figure 3 and Table 1). There are 
two clear phases to this change with the rate increase in employment being markedly 
faster after 1998 (6.6 percentage point rise over 4 years as opposed to 4.5 points over 
the preceding 6 years). An additional feature of the UK Tax Credit system is that to be 
eligible a lone parent has to work at least 16 hours a week, and the welfare reforms 
may therefore have encouraged those working few hours to increase their hours of 
labour supply. Table 1 also highlights how there has been an even more dramatic rise 
in lone parents employment among those working 16-hours a week plus since 1998. 
Here in just four years the employment rate for those working 16 or more hours per 
week has risen by 9.6 percentage points. 
Over this period there was also a steady increase in the incidence of single 
parenthood. The proportion of women aged 16-44 who were lone parents doubled 
from 8 to 16 percent between 1977/79 and 1998/2000. According to the HLFS, in 
2002 there are approximately 1.7 million lone parents, 350,000 (or 25%) more than in 
1992. Just over 90% of lone parents are women and they make up almost 1 in 4 
households with children. The rise in lone parenthood reflects first an increase in the 
rate of divorce and separation, and second a rise in the number of never married single 
mothers. Thus, while in 1977/79 fewer than one fifth on single parents had never been 
married, by 1998/2000 this figure stood at 40 percent. This change was associated 
with an increase in the number of single parents with a child aged under 5 in the 
1980s: in 1977/79 just twenty-seven percent of lone parents had a child under 5 
                                                 
4 The figure plots 3-year moving averages using data from the GHS from 1977/79 to 1991/93, and 
yearly averages using data from the HLFS from 1992-2002.Moving averages are used for the GHS data 
in order to overcome problems of small sample sizes.   5
compared to 42 percent in 1992. However, this proportion declined after 1992 to 32 
percent in 2002
5. These changes in the number of single parents with young children 
would lead us to expect employment rates to decline in the 1980s, and may also help 
explain the recent upturn in employment. In Figure 4, employment rates by age of 
youngest child are plotted for lone parents and married mothers, while rates of 
employment are recorded in Table 1. The figure illustrates that, while for married 
mothers there has been a sharp rise in the employment rates of married mothers with 
pre-school children since the mid 1980s, for lone parents this increase did not occur 
until the 1990s.  
 
III.  Historical Context and Recent Welfare Reforms 
Evidence on the Impact of Welfare Reform in Canada and US 
The incoming Labour government in 1997 initiated a series of policy reforms aimed at 
reducing child poverty and at raising employment in families with children. While 
international evidence has highlighted the low comparative employment rates of lone 
parents in the UK, evidence from North America has shown that lone parents 
employment rates are responsive to financial incentives and has highlighted the 
potential role of personal advisors in increasing their employment (Card and Robbins, 
1996, Eissa and Leibmann, 1996 and the NEWWS evaluations).  
In the US, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was introduced in 1975 as a 
minor programme. The generosity of the programme increased in 1986, 1990 and 
1993, with substantial increases introduced between 1994-96. The EITC has been the 
subject of substantial academic scrutiny, with studies unanimously finding it to have 
increased single parents’ employment (Eissa and Leibmann 1996, Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 2001, Blank, Card and Robbins 2000, Elwood 2000, Hotz, Mullin and 
Scholz 2001). These studies also noted that the EITC had a particularly large impact 
on the employment rates of lone parents with pre-school children, and for those who 
were less well educated. One of the earliest evaluations of the impact of the EITC on 
single parents employment was that of Eissa and Leibmann (1996). Eissa and 
Leibmann compared the employment rates of single women with and without children 
in order to assess the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) (which included an 
expansion of the EITC). Using a simple “difference-in-difference” technique to look 
                                                 
5 1977/79 data is from the GHS, data for 1992 and 2002 is from the LFS.   6
at changes in relative employment rates they concluded that welfare reform led to a 
2.8 percentage point increase in the relative employment rates of lone parents between 
1984-86 and 1988-90. They also assessed the impact of the TRA on hours of work. 
While economic theory predicts that those in work may respond to increases in the 
EITC by reducing their hours of work, Eissa and Leibman find no evidence in support 
of this.  
Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999) looked at the effect of later EITC increases, 
which occurred alongside other welfare reform initiatives, and attempted to identify 
the impact of the individual policies on lone parents employment rates. They 
document changes in welfare policies and single parents employment in the US 
between 1984-96. They then go on to develop a structural model of employment, 
identifying the impact of policies on employment by comparing single mothers with 
single childless women. They rely on state differences in the cost of living, taxes, 
earnings disregards and implicit tax rates to identify the policy effects. Meyer and 
Rosenbaum suggest that, of the 6 percentage point increase in single parents 
employment over the period 1984-96, around 60 percent can be attributed to increases 
in the EITC while a smaller portion of the change resulted from reductions in benefits, 
welfare waivers, training and childcare.  
  A more recent study by Elwood (2000) looks at the employment of lone 
parents across the predicted wage distribution. By comparing those least and most 
affected by welfare reform, and tracking their employment over time, Elwood argues 
he has a natural experiment. His study also depends on state variations in tax and 
welfare policy to enable identification of the impact of policy on employment. By 
defining states in terms of their “aggressiveness” of welfare reform, and by looking at 
the least and most aggressive regimes, he argues an upper bound can be found for the 
impact of the EITC on employment, while the difference in employment rates 
between the least and most aggressive states gives a lower bound for the impact of 
welfare reform. Of the increase in employment of low skilled single parents between 
1986 and 1998, he attributes 35 to 40 percent to welfare reform, 20 to 30 percent to 
increases in the EITC and Medicaid, and 25 to 30 percent to the strong economy.  
While policy reform in the US has been successful in getting single parents 
into work, it has been much less successful in raising the income of, or reducing 
poverty among, lone parents (see Blank 2002). Moreover, time limits on the receipt of 
tax credits, and fears that those in receipt of EITC may have limited potential for   7
wage growth, suggest that the main achievement of reforms may have been to reduce 
the welfare bill rather than to improve the welfare of lone parent families. 
In addition to this evidence, evaluations of experimental policy trials in North 
America have also been important in informing UK policy design. Of these, the 
Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), the Minnesota Family Investment Program 
(MFIP), Milwaukee New Hope Project and the California Gain programmes were 
perhaps the most influential. Results from the first two of these experiments led the 
UK to adopt of a twin track strategy of introducing financial incentives to “make work 
pay” alongside a system of case managed welfare, aimed at encouraging economic 
activity (including job search) and easing the problems faced by lone parents during 
the transition into work (in particular providing advice on benefit payments and 
childcare). Blank, Card and Robbins (1999) provide a summary of earlier findings 
suggesting that such a twin track approach can lead to more substantial employment 
gains than single policy reforms. The New Hope project in particular highlighted how 
the provision of quality childcare could help to improve child outcomes when lone 
mothers worked (Duncan and Chase-Lansdale, 1999), while results from the 
California GAIN project were influential in leading to the adoption of a work-first 
strategy in the UK, rather than focusing on training or education.  
 
Welfare Reform in the UK 
This evidence led the incoming government in 1997 to attempt two major policy 
reforms. The first was to raise the financial gains to working for families by means of 
the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC), and the second to introduce a case managed 
welfare system for lone parents aimed at raising their economic activity by the use of 
the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and Job Centre Plus programmes. These 
packages of reform, however, dramatically differed from the policy reforms that had 
been ongoing in the US in several key regards: there were no time limits on welfare 
receipt, searching for work was entirely voluntary, and welfare payments to non-
working lone parents  increased sharply (by contrast, benefits to non-working lone 
parents were squeezed in America)
6. So, unlike in the US where a key aim of policy 
reform was to reduce welfare payments, in the UK an explicit aim of policy reform 
has been to raise incomes and reduce deprivation among families with children. This   8
is typified by the government’s commitment to reduce the numbers of children living 
in relatively low income households (with low income defined as being less than 60% 
of median household income equivalised for family size after housing costs) by a 
million by 2004/5 and a longer term commitment to end child poverty. The 
government has also set a specific target for the employment of lone parents, aiming 
to get 70% into work by 2010. 
  While the introduction of the NDLP in 1998, and the replacement of Family 
Credit (FC) with WFTC from October 1999, represented a period of rapid change in 
welfare policy toward lone parents, there has not been a sustained period without 
reform since 1988 when FC was first introduced
7. Table 2 highlights the time line of 
major policy reforms since 1988, when FC was first introduced. Unlike welfare 
payments in general, the value of the credits available under FC and WFTC have 
typically increased significantly faster than prices over the last decade. Other changes 
include a reduction in the number of hours that lone parents were required to work in 
order to be eligible for in-work tax credits from 24 to 16 hours in 1992, and changes 
in the support available for childcare costs. In 1994 a childcare disregard was 
introduced, so that the applicable amount that lone parents could earn before the taper 
was applied was increased by up to £40 a week if childcare costs were incurred. A 
further change in 1995 introduced an additional credit for those working more than 30 
hours per week. Duncan and Giles (1996) suggest that the extra 30-hour credit 
introduced in 1996 made little difference to the labour market participation behaviour 
of lone parents, although it may have had some influence on the choice of working 
hours at the margin, while further evidence suggests that the childcare disregard was 
never widely used. 
  April 1998 saw the introduction of a more substantial set of reforms. First the 
NDLP, which had been piloted in a few areas from the autumn of 1997, was rolled out 
nationally. Initially only new claimants were the youngest child was over 5 were 
invited by letter to voluntarily attend a meeting to discuss participation. From October 
this was extended to the existing stock of claimants with children aged over 5. Those 
with younger children could also volunteer unsolicited to join the programme. In 
April 2000 the age cut off was dropped to 3. More substantially in April 2001 Worked 
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Focused Interviews (WFI) began for lone parents under the Job Centre Plus 
programme. This made attendance to discuss work options with an advisor 
compulsory, although there was still no requirement to seek work. Once again this 
programme is being rolled out, with all new claims where there is a child over 5 and 
the existing stock of lone parents with older children (aged 13-15) in the vanguard. 
This rollout process is expected to be completed by 2004 when it will cover all lone 
parents. 
  The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), and Family Credit (FC) that it 
replaced in October 1999, both share a common structure that can be represented as: 
 
Credit = C -  K(E -A)  |  hours> X 
 
The credit is an amount C that is determined by the number and ages of children in the 
family, less a fraction (taper) K of the difference between post-tax earnings E over a 
disregarded applicable amount A, and is subject to hours of work exceeding some 
minimum cut off X. In April 1998 the maximum credit available for a lone parent with 
two children aged 12 and 5 would have been £81:60 a week under FC, the applicable 
amount that lone parents could earn after tax before the credit began to be withdrawn 
was £80:65, and the taper rate was 70%. The introduction of WFTC in October 1999 
saw the maximum credit available rise to £93:05 a week (a real increase of 11%), 
while the applicable amount rose to £90 and the taper rate was reduced to 55%. The 
minimum hours threshold remained at 16. The move to WFTC in October 1999 
resulted in three major changes: first the credits became more generous, second 
variations in credits by age of children were progressively eliminated, and third the 
level of earnings at which credits could be retained increased substantially. These 
changes are illustrated in Figure 5. The increased generosity of the credits, the rise in 
the level of income which could be earned before credits began to be withdrawn, and 
the decrease in the rate at which withdrawal occurred, allowed more tax credits to be 
retained at higher levels of earnings. In the specimen household shown in Figure 5, a 
lone parent would stop receiving tax credits once her income reached £15,000 a year 
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in 1997, whereas under the 2001 regime this point is not reached until her income 
reaches around £22,500. The last major change in tax credits relates to the way in 
which childcare costs are treated. Whereas under FC childcare costs were added to the 
applicable amount  A, under WFTC a fraction of childcare costs (up to 70% of 
childcare costs of up to £120 a week) were added to the basic credits. This last change 
meant all part-time employed lone parent could now benefit from claiming for 
childcare costs, whereas before their earnings may well have been to low (below the 
applicable amount) to get any extra help. 
  From 2000 the generosity of IS payments to workless lone parents have also 
grown at a rate broadly in line with WFTC credits. Improved work incentives under 
the WFTC therefore appear to have resulted from the increase in the level of earnings 
that could be retained before tax credits were withdrawn and the improved support for 
childcare through the Childcare Tax Credits. In addition to the WFTC reforms there 
have also been changes in income tax and National Insurance rules that have affected 
low earning workers. In particular a 10 percent income tax band was introduced (now 
£1800 wide), the 2 percent NI entry fee was abolished, and the point at which NI 
payments were made was raised in alignment with the PAYE threshold. These 
changes were particularly valuable to part-time workers. Table 3 shows some 
hypothetical examples of how the financial returns to work changed from 1997 to 
2001. The regimes are compared for two hours options, 16 and 35 hours a week, at 
earnings of £4:20 per hour, which was just above the National Minimum Wage in 
2001. The comparisons have been adjusted for changes in prices, so no real wage rises 
are included in the table. A lone parent with two children aged under 11 would have 
gained only modestly from the reforms where she worked just 16 hours a week in a 
near minimum wage job. However, at longer hours (or by extension a higher wage) 
the additional returns are magnified. At 35 hours per week the reforms would have 
added  £23 per week to net income. For those claiming housing benefit the gains are 
however reduced: a lone parent renting a property and therefore also eligible for 
Housing Benefit (HB) gained just £15 a week for full-time work and virtually nothing 
for part-time work as a result of the reforms, as any gains from additional tax credits 
were mitigated by lower HB entitlements. On the other hand the new Childcare Tax 
Credit introduced support for childcare costs even at low part-time wages, and so 
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those with childcare costs saw large additional financial gains to work relative to 
1997. Moreover these childcare payments were exempt from i ncome under HB 
entitlement calculations under WFTC (whereas under FC these payments counted as 
income), meaning that those on housing benefit and paying for childcare costs had 
significantly improved work incentives. Overall, the effect of work incentives was 
therefore a mixed bag with extra incomes from working being quite large for those 
with higher weekly earnings or for those with lower earnings who pay for formal 
childcare.   
 
IV.  Changes in Welfare Receipt and Participation in the New Deal 
In 2002 there were around 1.7 million lone parents in the UK, of who approximately 
half (850,000) were on Income Support (IS). Figure 6 charts the number of lone 
parents claiming the main welfare payment for non-working lone parents, Income 
Support (or its pre 1988 equivalent, Supplementary Benefit), between 1971 and 2002. 
This shows that the decline in employment rates between 1971 and the early 1990s, 
combined with the increasing incidence of lone parenthood, has led to a fivefold rise 
in the number of claimants in  receipt of income support. Since the mid 1990s, 
however, the number of lone parents dependent on income support has sharply 
declined. This is perhaps surprising given that from 1999 onwards there has been a 
substantial increase in the generosity of Income Support payments (see Figure 6) with 
the average value payments increasing by over 20 percent in real terms between 1998 
and 2002.  
  As the numbers of lone parents dependent on income support have declined, 
the numbers receiving in-work benefits have grown rapidly. In May 2002, 706,000 
lone parents were in receipt of WFTC.  This is double the number in receipt of Family 
Credit in 1997, and nine times the numbers receiving FC in 1988 (Figure 7). This 
rapid rise in the number of lone parents claiming in work benefits has corresponded 
with a substantial increase in the generosity of the award, which increases in value 
from an average award of £35.13 in 1988 to £64.13 in 1998 and £88.34 in 2002 (all at 
2002 prices).  In 2002, over one-fifth of lone parents on WFTC (160,000) also 
received help with childcare costs with average value of £39.46. This was a fivefold 
increase in the numbers receiving assistance with childcare compare to 1998 (when 32 
thousand received help of on average £22 per week in 2002 prices).   12
This is the first study to look at the actual impact of the reform package on 
employment since its introduction in 1997. Blundell, Duncan, McRae and Meghir 
(1999) have however attempted to forecast the likely impact of the Working Families 
Tax Credit on employment. They have developed a model of labour supply, which 
they then use to simulate the effect of the WFTC introduction. The impact of other 
reforms, including the New Deals and other supporting tax and benefit reforms, were 
not considered. Their model suggested that the WFTC would lead to a 2.2 percentage 
point increase in single parents employment, of which 1.9 percentage points were 
expected to be full-time. Other more recent work by Blundell and Hoynes 
(forthcoming) contrasts the experience of the WFTC in the UK and the EITC in the 
US. They suggest that while the WFTC, on first sight, appears to be a significantly 
more substantial benefit package than the EITC, with both a steeper rate of phase in 
and phase out, because of the ways in which WFTC interacts with other benefits, in 
particular housing benefit, they predict that the actual impact on employment will be 
small.  
In 2002, approximately 10 percent (83,740) of lone parent on Income Support 
(IS) were also participating in the New Deal for Lone Parents. The government has 
claimed a significant success rate for the New Deal, with 52 percent of those leaving 
the NDLP taking up employment (although many may have in any case left welfare in 
the absence of the New Deal). In total, the Department for Work and Pensions report 
that since inception, 186,260 lone parents have left the New Deal to employment and 
35,450 have started education or training. Evidence from studies of the impact of the 
piloted version of this scheme suggested that the NDLP has had a small positive 
impact on employment (see Elias et. al., 2000). Evidence from other countries also 
suggests that such personal advisor schemes can be effective. Similar advisory 
services have also been introduced in Canada alongside the SSP programme (in a 
programme known as SSP plus). This scheme offered job search and other 
employment services to lone parents, with a key aim of breaking down some of the 
barriers to work faced by lone parents. The evaluation evidence suggests that those 
offered SSP plus had employment rates 7.4 percentage points higher than those 
offered only the earnings supplement (see Blank et al. 1999).  Finally, a study by 
Evans (2001), in his analysis of welfare to work policies in five countries, concludes 
that personal advisor schemes have worked well where backed by appropriate 
resources (such as childcare).   13
 
V.   Data and Methodology 
As many lone parents live with other adults, in order to identify lone parent families 
we need to look at family units within households and then examine the relationship 
between family members. The HLFS and GHS both contain full sets of family unit 
and household identifiers, allowing us to determine the relationship between 
individuals and the head of the family unit. The HLFS is constructed from the Spring 
Labour Force Surveys from 1992, and since 1996 also includes the Autumn LFS. It 
contains around 60,000 households, of which just over 5,000 contain lone parents in 
any year. As the HLFS only begins in 1992, we use the smaller General Household 
Survey (GHS) to backdate our data to the late 1970s.  The GHS is a smaller data set, 
containing between 6,000 and 8,000 households per year, and between 500 and 700 
family units headed by lone parents. Both data sets contain detailed information on 
employment status, hours of work and personal characteristics. However, the HLFS 
has wage information for only a sub-set of approximately 40 percent of respondents 
and is not well suited to constructing family income measures. The GHS on the other 
hand has fuller information on incomes and wages, but was not undertaken in 1997 
and 1999 and is less up-to-date (the data for 2001-2002 has yet to be released). Hence 
income and poverty measures are best drawn from other sources. 
The primary objective of this paper is to assess the impact of the package of 
policy reforms introduced in 1998 on lone parent employment. The methodology we 
use is similar to that of Eissa and Leibman (1996), who take a “difference-in-
difference” approach to assessing the impact of policy on employment. While this 
methodology cannot precisely disentangle individual policy effects, Elwood (2000) 
concludes that  it “presents powerful and straightforward evidence” on behavioural 
impacts. In order to take account of differences in observed characteristics between 
lone parents and our comparison group we use propensity score matching. This allows 
us a construct a counterfactual of what would have happened to lone parents 
employment in the absence of policy changes, and allows the impact of the economic 
cycle on employment to differ across the population by gender, age, education, region 
and so on. This methodology is outlined in further detail below.  
As our objective is to estimate the impact of policy reform on lone parents 
employment, if we denote employment by  Y then the impact of policy change on   14
employment is the difference between the post policy outcome, Y`, and the outcome 
that would have occurred in the absence of policy changes, Y￿.  Letting L=1 for those 
effected by the policy change (the treated group of lone parents), the impact of policy 
reform is therefore given by: 
E(Y` - Y￿|L=1) =E(Y`|L=1)- E(Y￿|L=1) 
As we do not have experimental data, and as no group of lone parents are unaffected 
by the reforms, we cannot observe E(Y￿|L=1), the average employment rate of lone 
parents that would have existed in the absence of policy reform. We must therefore 
estimate this counterfactual from our sample of non-lone parents. The ideal 
counterfactual group should not have experienced any policy shocks effecting their 
employment, but should have the same set of observed and unobserved employment 
attributes, have experienced the same local labour market shocks, and reacted in an 
identical way to them. The benchmark group therefore should share as many common 
characteristics as possible with the focus group; the only difference between them 
should be their experience of policy.   
Lone parents have two defining characteristics, having children and not having 
a resident partner. Hence there are two natural comparator groups: couples with 
children and singles without children. However, while comparisons with couples are 
interesting, this group is not entirely unaffected by policy change. The WFTC is open 
to all families with children, and research suggests that the design of the WFTC may 
induce second earners within couples to reduce their labour supply (see Blundell et al 
1999, Eissa and Hoynes, 1998). Singles without children are on the other hand 
unaffected by the WFTC but may have been affected by the NI reforms which 
reduced taxes on part-time jobs, although part-time work is relatively scarce among 
this group. Two further “New Deal” programmes may also have affected the 
employment of single childless people: the New Deal for Young People and the New 
Deal for 25 plus. However these programmes cover only a tiny fraction of this group. 
As singles without children are relatively unaffected by policy change, we therefore 
use them as our main control group. However to the extent that these policies may 
have affected the employment of singles without children, they will tend to bias 
downwards our estimates of the impact of policy reform on lone parents employment.   15
While single childless people fulfil our criteria of being, to a first 
approximation, unaffected by policy change, they differ from lone parents in terms of 
both observed and unobserved characteristics. In order to account for differences in 
observed characteristics, X, we undertake propensity score matching. While one-to-
one matching on observable characteristics offers one-way of improving the 
alignment of the focus and control groups, where a large number of controls are used 
finding an individual with identical characteristics becomes hard. This may lead to 
problems of lack of  “common support” and lead to biases in estimation. Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) derive the important result that matching can instead be done on the 
predicted propensity that an individual is a member of the treatment group. Using a 
dummy variable L to denote lone parenthood, the propensity score is defined as the 
probability that L=1 given X so that: 
P(X)=Pr(L=1,X) 
The propensity score is then estimated from a combined sample of lone parents and 
singles without children using a logit model. In this case instead of matching on many 
variables we are now conditioning on just one variable, the propensity score. The 
explanatory variables in the logit model include those characteristics that are thought 
to influence employment, as the aim is to net out any differences in the sensitivity of 
our samples to employment shocks across different segments of the population. The 
variables included in the logit model are gender, age and education (both interacted 
with gender), ethnicity, region of residence, and housing tenure type.  
Propensity score matching can be undertaken using a number of different 
rules. Here we use a local linear matching estimator, which has shown to be 
computationally efficient by Fan (1992). This averages employment propensities 
across all benchmark observations that fall within a window around an observation of 
interest, with the weighting attached to each observation derived from its closeness to 
the outcome of interest. We use a bandwidth (window) of .08
8.  This method of 
matching allows us to find individuals who are not single parents, but have otherwise 
comparable characteristics that influence employment propensities, and hence may be 
thought to have the same sensitivity to aggregate employment shocks.  
In propensity score matching a common failure of the model occurs where 
there is no “common support”. This means that for a significant portion of the sample   16
no individuals with similar propensity scores can be found. Matching is in this case 
problematic, as using observations which are not close matches leads to biases in 
estimation while dropping those observations for which a match cannot be found also 
leads to bias or non-identification of the model. For our sample of lone parents we are 
able to find a large number of good matches in the much larger population of singles 
without children and so the problem of lack of common support does not arise. 
Matching aligns the observed characteristics of the benchmark population and 
our sample of lone parent so that the distribution of observable characteristics, X, are 
the same for the two  populations, thereby mimicking this feature of randomised 
experiments. As we find matched samples in every year, shifts in the composition of 
observable characteristics of lone parents are captured. However, while under random 
assignment it can be assumed that differences in unobservable characteristics are also 
accounted for, and finding the impact of policy is therefore straightforward
9, this is 
not the case here as lone parents are bound to differ in unobservable ways from any 
other control group that can be generated from the non-lone parent population. 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) argue that in non-randomised matched samples 
a conditional difference-in-difference estimator mimics the desirable features of 
random assignment experiments. Unlike Heckman et al., we do not have panel data 
for both samples, but rather samples drawn from the two populations before and after 
policy reform. Our approach is therefore to assume that any difference in employment 
rates between the focus group and the matched sample is generated by differences in 
unobserved characteristics. Assuming that this gap is constant, and denoting non-lone 
parents by NL, then:  
E(Y￿ | X, L =1) = E(Y￿ | X, NL =1) + K 
Here it is assumed that differences in employment rates for the focus group and the 
matched sample are fixed by a magnitude equal to the observed employment gap prior 
to policy change. In this simple before and after model this gap is assumed not to vary 
over time. This assumption can be relaxed by introducing a time trend.  
E(Y￿ | X, L =1) = E(Y￿ | X, NL =1) + K + b*(Time) 
                                                                                                                                            
8  We use the Stata supplement package developed by Barabara Sianesi which is 
downloadable via the Stata website. 
9 The policy impact is just the difference in the employment rate of those who are and 
who are not effected by the experiment, conditioning on observed characteristics.   17
Here, the time trend is estimated by assuming that the two samples employment rates 
are converging or diverging at a constant rate, and this rate of 
convergence/divergence, b, is assumed to be equal to that which was occurring in the 
pre-policy change environment.   
In summary, therefore, the expected employment outcome for lone parents in 
the absence of policy change is estimated as the current employment outcome of the 
benchmark group, conditioned on observable characteristics, which is then adjusted 
for fixed pre-policy differences in employment and for the pre-policy rate of 
convergence or divergence in the rates of employment of lone parents and the 
benchmark sample. Once we have estimated this counterfactual, we are then able to 
compare the predicted and actual employment rates of lone parents after policy 
change. The resulting difference can be interpreted as the impact of policy on 
employment. 
Using standard difference-in-difference techniques for an affected and an 
unaffected benchmark sample, where the benchmark population is drawn from singles 
without children using propensity-matching techniques, we can assess the impact of 
policy on lone parents employment. Note that the length of the initial comparison 
period is relatively arbitrary. Moreover, the impact of policy on lone parents 
employment prior to 1998 was non-neutral although the likely positive impact of the 
1992 reforms to Family Credit will if anything tend to push our estimates downwards. 
We report results using 1992-1998 as our pre-period
10. Using alternative years give 
results that are similar, though generally slightly larger, than those reported here. 
Hence we err on the side of caution, if anything underestimating the impact of policy, 
in our main reported results. Strictly speaking our estimates of the impact of policy 
reform in 1998 show how lone parents employment has reacted to changes in policy. 
However we believe that the effect of policy on lone parents employment rates prior 
to 1998 was small, although it may have had a larger impact on the choice of working 
hours. Likewise, the impact of NI reforms and of the New Deal programmes on 
employment rates of single people without children after 1998 tend to push our 
estimates of the impact of policy downwards. Again though the conclusions of Van 
Reenan (2001) or Riley and Young (2000) would imply that these effects are likely to 
be small.  
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VI.  Changes in Lone Parents Employment  
While we are most concerned with what has happened to employment since 1998, 
when a major package of policy reforms were introduced with the aim of getting lone 
parents into work, it is also useful to consider employment rates in the two decades 
prior to these policy reforms, particularly in light of the large drop in lone parents 
employment in the early 1980s. Using data from the GHS we assess changes in lone 
parents employment over the periods 1979-86 and 1986-92 before going on to look at 
subsequent changes. 
 
Changes in Employment from 1979-1992 
From 1979 to 1987 working lone parents were entitled to claim Family Income 
Supplement. This was a relatively minor benefit, and take up was low. In 1988 Family 
Credit was introduced, which increased the level of support for working lone parents. 
More details of these policies were reported in Table 2 and were discussed earlier. 
Table 4 reports employment rates of lone parents and matched samples of single 
childless people and married couples with children. It is perhaps surprising that the 
large dip in lone parents employment is fully mirrored in the matched samples over 
the period 1979-86, implying that changes in lone parents characteristics and the 
economic downturn can fully explain the drop in lone parents employment over this 
period. Between 1986 and 1992 lone parents employment continued to decline, 
though at a slower rate than in the early 1980s. Comparing lone parents with the 
matched samples, we find that lone parents employment rates did fall behind those of 
with similar characteristics who were in couples with children, although the 
difference-in-difference estimates are small. However, when compared with single 
childless people the result is neutral both before and after 1988, suggesting that 
reforms introduced around this period had little impact on lone parents employment. It 
also suggests that our preferred benchmark group of single childless adults act as a 
good benchmark for tracking lone parents employment once matching is used. This 
change is primarily driven by the decline in employment rates among those living in 
rented housing. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
10 1992 is the first year for which data is available from the HLFS.   19
Changes in Employment from 1992-2002 
According to the Household Labour Force Survey, between 1992 and 2002 
employment rates of lone parents rose from 42 to 53 percent. This rise began before 
the new policy regime came into effect in 1998, but sped up thereafter with the annual 
rate of increase more than doubling from 0.75 percentage points a year between 1992 
and 1998 to 1.65 points a year afterwards. Table 1 showed two other key 
developments over the period. First there has been a compositional shift among lone 
parents away from those with very young children (single never married women with 
children aged 0 to 2). However, this change has occurred throughout the decade at a 
broadly constant rate, of just under one percentage point per year, so the impact on the 
difference-in-difference estimates in our matched samples should be small. Second 
there was a decade long sustained rise in employment among the population as a 
whole from 1992 onwards. Row 6 of Table 1 shows the employment time path for the 
total non-lone parent population aged 16-59. This indicates that while employment 
rates rose throughout the period for the population as a whole, there was a marked 
slow down after 1998. This allows us to perform a simple difference in difference 
calculation of the change in the labour market performance of lone parents relative to 
the rest of the population (see Table 5). The numbers reported here are not conditional 
on characteristics and serve only as an indicator of the changing relative  labour 
market performance of lone parents.  Lone parents saw a rise in employment nearly 
six points higher than the rest of the population after 1998. However, lone parents had 
been making relative gains prior to 1998, which may have continued in the absence of 
policy reform. A simple difference-in-difference calculation suggests that policy 
reform since 1998 has raised lone parents employment rates relative to the population 
average by around 4.6 percentage points. The lower panel of Table 5 tells the same 
story, but this time compares lone parents to women in couples with children. Again 
this is just an unconditional comparison of the relative performance of the two groups. 
Lone parents had seen slower employment growth than other mothers prior to 1998 
but have posted a 5-percentage point relative gain since 1998. However, as previously 
discussed, couples with children may have been affected by policy reform as second 
earners in couples were the main earner is on a relatively low wage now have reduced 
incentives to work. Using couples as a benchmark group may therefore upwardly bias 
our estimates of the impact of policy reform on lone parents employment. From now 
on we therefore concentrate on comparisons with singles without children as this   20
group is least affected by the tax and benefit reforms, and have been shown earlier to 
provide a good historical benchmark.  
Table 6 (upper panel) shows how lone parents have fared when compared to 
all single women without children. This shows a somewhat smaller raw difference-in-
difference estimate than when the whole population or just couples with children are 
used as a comparison.  Using the propensity matching technique described earlier, we 
construct a matched sample from our sample of singles without children. This 
conditional estimate thus includes some men, as around 8 percent of lone parents are 
men. This method of estimation predicts that since 1998 lone parents employment has 
risen by 6-percentage points more than would have been expected from a population 
of singles without children with the same characteristics, ignoring any pre-1998 trend.  
If we believe that the relative employment gains made by lone parents were 
entirely due to policy reforms between 1992 and 1998, then this simple difference 
model provides an estimate of the impact of post-98 policy reform. This estimate 
might be considered an upper bound however as we have not yet accounted for the 
fact that lone parents employment rates were increasing relative to the population as a 
whole prior to 1998. We therefore also estimate the gains in employment attributable 
to policy change taking into account trend changes in the relative employment of lone 
parents that were occurring prior to 1992, the trend being estimated from the 
annualised change in relative employment rates between 1992 and 1998. These 
estimates suggest that policy changes have led to a 5 -percentage point gain in 
employment. As any increases in employment, which resulted from improvements in 
incentives to work prior to 1998, are now deducted from our estimates, our estimates 
of the impact of the post-1998 policy reforms on employment are now likely to be 
biased downwards. This then is a lower bound estimate of the impact of policy reform 
on lone parents employment. Using 1995 as an alternative base year from which to 
calculate the trend produces a slightly higher estimate of the impact of policy reform 
on employment, with an estimated impact of 5.2 percentage points. While this may be 
a cleaner estimate, as there was little further policy reform between 1995 and 1998, 
using 1995-98 to calculate the time trend is not entirely satisfactory because it is such 
a short window of time. These estimates, however, seem to offer a reasonably tight 
plausible range of the likely impact of the post-1998 policy reform on the employment 
of lone parents, suggesting that policy change has lead to an increase in lone parents   21
employment of around 5-percentage points. This translates into getting an additional 
80,000 lone parents into work. 
One potential criticism of the matching techniques used here is that if 
employment rates of the comparator group are sufficiently high there may be an 
asymmetry in the way that lone parents and the comparator group respond to changes 
in the economic environment. Thus any difference in employment growth between the 
two populations may be due to this asymmetry rather than a response to policy 
change. Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999) have argued that for the US this is not a 
compelling argument as employment rates among the matched sample are also low. 
Our matched samples of single non lone-parents also have relatively low employment 
rates compared to the population as a whole (with employment rates of 63 percent in 
1992, with similar estimates from the GHS and HLFS data). An alternative would be 
to test the impact of policy on a comparator group with similarly low employment 
rates (although this group should also be unaffected by policy changes). In the 
following section we look at variations in employment by education for a matched 
sample of lone parents and single childless people, and observe similar gains in 
relative employment. These results suggest that this criticism is not a strong one. 
 
Differences by Age of Youngest Child and Education 
Research in the US and Canada has suggested that policy reform in these countries 
has had a particularly strong effect for those with younger children and for the less 
well educated. Also we noted earlier there has been a decline in the share of lone 
parents with very young children. This compositional shift may affect our estimates of 
the impact of policy on employment, as age of children cannot be contained in the 
matching function. As this compositional shift was continuous throughout the decade 
we expect the effect to be largely netted out by the difference-in-difference estimator. 
However to test that this is the case, we repeat the matching analysis for different 
groups of lone parents according to the age of the youngest child. Furthermore there 
may be important variations in the impact of policy according to the age of the 
youngest child. For example, the Childcare Credit element of the WFTC meets up to 
70% of childcare costs up to a limit of £100 per week. These payments are only 
available for formal childcare arrangements and are therefore likely to be of most 
value to parents with pre-school children. On the other hand, IS payments for those 
not working have increased most for those with younger children. From 1998-2002   22
the payment value for a child under 11 rose by £16:15 (£17:35 to £33:50) while for 
children aged 11 to 15 the rate rose by just £8:15 (£20:35 to 33:50) as the pre-existing 
age differences in support rates were removed. While these changes were also 
mimicked in the WFTC, there may still be a wealth effect that is larger for those with 
young children. Table 7 outlines the difference-in-difference estimates for lone 
parents by the age of the youngest child. These suggest that the effect of policy has 
been greatest among those with pre-school age children: for those with children under 
5 the policy the effect on employment is predicted to be just under 6 percentage 
points. For those whose youngest child was aged 5 to 10 the gain in employment since 
1998 is similar to that for those with younger children, but this group had been 
making stronger relative gains prior to 1998. On the other hand those with older 
children have made little relative gain in employment since 1998, although they had 
been losing ground prior to 1998. So net of prior trends, these two latter groups of 
lone parents have made similar progress in terms of their relative employment since 
1998 according to the difference-in-difference estimate. The average of these three 
estimates, using 1998 sample shares, produces a mean estimated difference-in-
difference estimate of 5.03 percentage points. This is just a fraction higher than when 
the groups are not separated, and reflects the declining share of lone parents with very 
young children since 1998.  
We may also expect to see variations in the employment rates of lone parents 
according to the level of education they have attained. This is because the incentives 
to work have improved most for the less well educated, as they tend to have relatively 
poor earnings potential. In Table 8 we split our sample into those whose highest 
qualification is “O” levels or below and those with “A” levels or degrees. We find that 
the employment effect has been marginally greater for the relatively well educated. 
This probably reflects the weak gains to work that remain at relatively low wages, and 
the generosity of the WFTC, which extends relatively far up the earnings distribution 
(indeed around 90 percent of working lone parents are in receipt of WFTC).  
 
VI.  Hours of Work, Earnings and Poverty 
 
Hours 
The WFTC and its predecessor FC have a relatively unusual feature for tax and 
welfare systems in that they are conditional on working a minimum number of   23
hours.
11 Lone parents must work a minimum of 16 hours in order to claim the tax 
credit, and there is a supplementary credit if they work in excess of 30 hours. These 
thresholds are designed to reduce the effect of high marginal effective tax rates 
leading people to choose shorter hours of work. As a result the move to the WFTC is 
likely to have had a mixed impact on hours of work. The increased generosity of the 
scheme would be expected to encourage those who had been working fewer than 16 
hours a week to increase their hours of work, while those working more than 16 hours 
may decide to reduce their hours as a result of the “windfall effect” of increased 
welfare payments. New rules meaning that the childcare tax credit was now available 
for those working part-time may have further reinforced this effect. However, the 
reduction of the withdrawal rate of the tax credits from 70 percent of after tax 
earnings to 55 percent would have the opposite effect on hours of work for those 
already in receipt of tax credits. Finally, the extension of coverage to lone parents who 
would have previously been ineligible for help because their earnings were too high 
earnings would now have an incentive to reduce hours of work. 
  Figure 8 shows the evolution of the distribution of hours of work among lone 
parents over the decade. Between 1992 and 1998 the number of lone parents working 
fewer than 16 hours a week fell, while there was an increase in the number working 
between 16 and 23 hours. This probably reflects changes in the FC hours rules in 
1992, when the minimum hours threshold was cut from 24 to 16. The creation of a 
spike at 16-23 hours appears to have occurred because lone parents working fewer 
than 16 hours and more than 24 hours a week were drawn into this threshold between 
1992 and 1998. The transition to WFTC after 1998 saw a further decline in short 
working hours, and an increase in the share of lone parents working 24 to 30 hours. 
There was no clear change in hours of work for those previously employed full-time. 
Table 9 shows how average hours of work have changed. For all lone parents 
(including those out of work, with zero hours) rose by 2.5 hours a week, or just over 
20 percent, between 1998 and 2002. Obviously this change includes the effect of 
increased participation; among working lone parents however average weekly hours 
of work also increased from an average of 27.3 to 28.5 hours a week (a 5 percent 
rise).   
                                                 
11 The Canadian SSP required full-time working for lone parents to be eligible and had the effect of 
reducing numbers working part-time.   24
There are three further issues we may wish to consider when thinking about 
the impact of welfare reform on the choice of hours of work among lone parents. First 
did the reforms induce people working less than 16 hours a week to increase their 
hours  of work in order to get WFTC? Second, did the large numbers entering 
employment after the reforms do so at significantly different hours than those who 
were already working? And third what was the net effect on hours of work among 
those already working more than 16 hours? The first question is relatively easy to 
assess. We simply repeat the earlier analysis to look at changes in the proportion 
employed for more than16 hours a week. Looking at Figure 8, we might expect the 
predicted impact of policy on the 16-hours plus employment rate employment to be 
larger than that on total employment. Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect 
of policy reform on the 16-hour plus employment rate are reported in Table 10. These 
suggest that policy has raised this employment rate by 7.2 percentage points, implying 
that an additional 120,000 lone parents work more than 16 hours a week. As hours of 
work may also have responded to the 1992 policy changes, we may also wish to use 
1995 to compute our difference-in-difference estimates. When 1995 is chosen as the 
base year, the estimated rise in employment increases further to 9 percentage points. 
This move from hours of work below 16 hours a week is not focused on those with 
younger children. 
The question of whether those entering employment did so at different hours 
of work than the incumbents, and whether those already in employment reduced their 
hours of work, is addressed here by matching the 1998 and 2002 samples of lone 
parents. The matching estimator used here uses simple one-on-one matching on the 
propensity score of being a lone parent in 1998. By matching lone parents in the 1998 
data to those in the 2002 data we are able to find those lone parents who look like 
incumbents (i.e. those who would have worked in the absence of policy reform), 
while those working lone parents in 2002 data who do not have a close match in the 
1998 sample can be considered to be the labour market entrants who have entered into 
employment as a consequence of the policy reforms. As the samples considered here 
working 16+ hours a week, we are able also to match them on a large range of 
industry, occupation and job tenure variables, as well as on the characteristics of the 
lone parents and the age and number of their children. When we do this we find that 
employment of lone parents has grown notably fast in two sectors: “retail and 
catering” and “other private services”.    25
Table 10 shows that the average hours of work among those working more 
than 16 hours fell by just over an hour between 1998 and 2002. Our matched 
estimates suggest those who have entered work as a result of the reforms (the 
“entrants”) work fewer hours than those matched to the 1998 population of lone 
parents (the “incumbents”) using employment and personal characteristics. We 
predict that the incumbents have reduced their average hours of work marginally, by 
around half an hour a week, in response to the windfall effect of increased welfare 
income. This fall is not however statistically significant and any failure in the 
matching process would tend to bias downwards the 2002 estimate of hours of work. 
We conclude that there is no significant reduction in hours worked among lone 
parents who would have worked in the absence of the policy reform, which is in line 
with the findings of Eissa and Leibman (1997) for the US. As expected, the entrants 
into the labour force have less “taste for work” than the incumbents, and therefore we 
predict that their average hours of work should be lower by around 2 hours a week.    
 
Earnings 
In order to get some indication of how policy reform has affected lone parents 
welfare, we look at what has happened to their earnings
12.  The LFS only contains 
information on earnings for a subset of around 40 percent of all respondents in each 
quarter
13. This reduces our sample sizes considerably, particularly as the number of 
employed lone parents is also small. These small sample sizes mean that the standard 
errors on our earnings data are relatively large, although the numbers reported can be 
thought of as indicative. The second panel of Table 9 reports median weekly earnings 
for lone parents in 1998 and 2002. For all working lone parents, median weekly 
earnings jumped by 36 percent in real terms between 1998 and 2002. This was an 
increase substantially above that for our benchmark group of single childless women, 
who saw earnings rise by just 13 percent over the same period. This difference was 
partly a result of the fact that the 16-hour rule under the WFTC led to a significant 
increase in hours of work among those previously working short hours. Looking only 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately the HLFS does not have data on household income. 
 
13 All respondents are interviewed over five quarters, with information being recorded on earnings in 
the first and fifth quarters only.   26
at those working over 16 hours a week, we find that changes in weekly earnings have 
increased by a more modest 11 percent.  
As labour supply increases we might expect average earnings of lone parents 
to fall if the new entrants have poor labour market characteristics relative to those 
already in work. We therefore split the 2002 sample into “incumbents” and “entrants”. 
Again we define the incumbent sample by matching our sample of 2002 lone parents 
on the characteristics of lone parents in employment in 1998, while the “entrants” are 
those employed in 2002 but with no close match in the 1998 data. The median 
earnings of the matched sample of incumbents were relatively high compared to the 
entrants in 2002, being 9 percent higher than those of the new entrants. Moreover, the 
rate at which pay has grown among the incumbents is almost exactly the same as that 
of single women without children. As over the same time period in-work benefits 
increased by an average of approximately £30 per week, this suggests a large 
improvement in the incomes of working lone parents. This, and the fact that those 
lone parents who are not in work have also seen large increases in their incomes, 
means that the UK’s experience of policy  reform contrasts radically with the 
experience of policy reform in the US.  
Our data is not well placed to analyse total income, so we turn instead to other 
authors’ estimates of changes in lone parent’s poverty rates in order to illustrate how 
these changes in employment may have affected poverty. Pichaud and Sutherland 
(2002) summarize recent patterns of relative poverty in the UK using standard poverty 
definitions (60% of median household income, equivalised using the McClements 
scales). They show that in the four years between the fiscal years of 96/7 and 2000/01 
the overall rate of child poverty fell by around 4.5 percentage points (this measure 
being similar using both the before and after housing costs measures of poverty), 
while among lone parent families the poverty rate fell by 8.2 percentage points, from 
62.0 to 53.8. Poverty rates have also fallen among couples with children, but to a 
much smaller extent. Dickens and Ellwood (2003), using a modified poverty measure 
to make comparisons with the US, find similar reductions in poverty. They show that 
in the first four years of office the Blair government made relative and absolute 
poverty gains which were of almost exactly the same magnitude as the gains made in 
the US since Clinton was elected in 1992. For lone parents, using an absolute measure 
of poverty, they find that poverty rates fell by 16 percentage points in the UK between 
1997 and 2000 and the same amount in US between 1992 and 2001.  Moreover, as the   27
latest UK data covered only the 2000/01 fiscal year the effect of the October 2000 
welfare increases may not have been fully captured, while none of the impact of the 
changes applied in October 2001are included. So the dramatic reductions in poverty 
among lone parents in the UK may well continue for several more years yet. Dickens 
and Elwood also decompose the poverty reductions into contributory factors such as 
demographics, wage inequality, work patterns and welfare. Their findings suggest that 
improvements in the hours of work of lone parents underlie around 40 percent of the 
decline in relative poverty  
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Lone parents are bringing up one-in-four children in the UK. Until recently these 
families have suffered from extremely high rates of poverty and worklessness. From 
1998 the Labour government has introduced a wave of reforms aimed at reducing 
worklessness and poverty in lone parent families, increasing welfare payments to  
those in and out of work, improving the financial gains to work, and introducing a 
more pro-active welfare system in the form of the New Deal for Lone Parents. Using 
a combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-difference estimation 
techniques we find that these policies have raised employment of lone rates by around 
5 percentage points while increasing hours of work among those already in 
employment. The increase in the number of hours worked has been a consequence of 
lone parents shifting from short hours to over 16-hours a week in order to become 
eligible for tax credits. We estimate that the proportion of lone parents working at 
least 16 hours a week has risen by 7 percentage points over the last four years as a 
result of the policy changes, meaning that an additional 120,000 lone parents are now 
working 16+ hours a week as a result of the reforms. Hours of work among those 
already working more than 16 hours a week appear to be broadly constant; there is no 
evidence that the windfall effect, which has resulted from increased benefits being 
given to those already in work, has led to a reduction in their working hours. These 
employment gains appear not to have come at the expense of lower earnings, and it 
appears that the least educated have not been more responsive to the reforms than 
better educated lone parents. Those lone parents who remain outside employment are 
increasingly less well skilled and concentrated in rented housing, and are a group for 
whom work incentives remain weak.   28
  The gains in earnings and employment that have occurred since 1998 have 
resulted from a package of welfare reforms that have not required mandatory job 
search by lone parents, nor relied on time limited welfare programmes. Moreover the 
employment gains have been achieved despite generous increases in welfare 
payments for lone parents who do not work. Given the scale of the employment gains 
found, these results are hugely important for the US debate on welfare reform. 
Increases in earnings combined with more generous welfare payments are making 
rapid progress in reducing child poverty rates among lone parent families w hen 
measured on an absolute basis, and have also lead to substantial gains in reducing 
relative poverty. These gains have matched what has been achieved in the US since 
1992, but at a much faster pace. As the generosity of welfare payments continue to 
increase, and as reforms aimed at improving work incentives in the UK welfare 
system are not yet complete
14, further gains are likely over the next few years. 
However, while substantial progress has already been made, it is not yet on a 
sufficient scale for it to be likely that the government’s target of getting 70 percent of 
lone parents into employment by 2010 will be reached. 
 
                                                 
14 A revised system of tax credits come into force in April 2003.   29
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Figure 1: International Comparisons of Lone Parents Employment Rates 
Lone Parents Employment Rate




















Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2001  33
Figure 2: Employment Gaps 
 
a) 
Employment Gap: Single / Married Mothers





















Employment Gap: Lone Parents / Single Childless Women
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Figure 3 











































Note: Data from 1978-1991 is taken from the General Household Survey. In order to 
overcome the problem of small sample sizes among lone parents, three-year moving 





   35
Figure 4: 
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Note: Data from 1978-1991 is taken from the General Household Survey. In order to 
overcome the problem of small sample sizes among lone parents, three-year moving averages 
are used. Data from 1992 to 2002 comes from the Labour Force Survey. 
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Note: Assumes live-alone lone parent, 2 children under 11, no housing costs or childcare costs. Entitlement for WFTC 
reached at £3,400, or 16 hours work/week at the minimum wage. Values uprated to April 2002 prices.








































Source: Brewer and Gregg 2002 


































































Note: Assumes live-alone lone parent, 2 children under 11, no housing costs or childcare costs. Entitlement for WFTC reached at £3,400, or 16 hours work/week at the minimum wage. 
Values uprated to April 2002 prices.  37




























1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
Notes:  1. Great Britain (excludes NI), figures for May. 
2. Source Working Families Tax Credit Statistics Quarterly Enquiry May 2002, 2002 
prices.   38
Figure 7 









































































Notes:  1. Great Britain (excludes NI), figures for May. 2002 prices. 
2. Source Working Families Tax Credit Statistics Quarterly Enquiry May 2002,   39
Figure 8: Kernel Density Distribution of Hours of Work of Lone Parents in 1992, 
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Table 1: Lone Parent Employment Rates 
 
Group/Year  1978-80  1985-87  1991-93  1992  1995  1998  2000  2002  1998-1993  2002-1998 
Lone Parent 
Employment Rate 
51.5  44.3  41.8  42.1  43.9  46.6  49.9  53.2  4.5  6.6 
Emp. Rate : Youngest 
Child 0-2 
24.5  17.5  21.2  21.0  22.8  23.0  29.7  30.4  2.0  7.4 
Emp. Rate : Youngest 
Child 3-4 
31.2  26.0  29.0  30.6  34.1  36.5  37.8  41.0  5.9  4.5 
 
Emp. Rate : Youngest 
Child 5-10 
56.6  48.4   49.9  44.8  46.0  50.1  50.7  56.4  5.3  6.3 
 
Emp. Rate : Youngest 
Child 11+ 
65.4  65.2  63.0  65.1  63.4  64.3  68.6  68.1  -0.8  3.8 
 
Share with Youngest 
Child Aged 0-2 
16.9  23.2  28.4  27.7  23.6  21.9  21.2  18.9  -5.8  -3.0 
Employment Rate 
working > 16 hours 
39.4  33.7  30.5  34.1  37.1  38.9  43.0  48.5  4.8  9.6 
Non-Lone Parent Emp. 
Rate (ages 16-59) 
77.1  74.2  74.5  73.3  74.1  76.2  76.7  77.1  2.9  0.9 
 
Data from 1978-80 to 1991-93 is from the General Household Survey, from 1992 onwards data is from the Labour Force Survey. 
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Table 2:  Reform of Welfare Systems affecting Lone Parents 1988- 2002 
1988 
•  Family credit introduced to replace Family Income Supplement (FIS). Basic adult credit plus per 
child element variable across age of child, £6:05 (0-11) £11:40 (12-15) £14:70 (16-17) £21:35 
(18). Must be employed 24+ hours and taper 70%. 
1992 
•  July: Minimum hours reduced to 16. 
1994 
•  October: Childcare charges could be offset against earnings up to £40 
1995 
•  July: 30 hours extra credit introduced 
1997 
•  NDLP Phase 1: July 1997 to October 1998. Launched in 8 pilot areas.  
•  Lone Parent Supplementary rates abolished for new claims – worth CHB £6:30 IS £5:20 
•  IS rates £16:90 (0-10), £24:75 (11-15), £29.60 (16-18) 
•  FC Rates  £12:05 (0-10) £19:95 (11-15) £24.80 (16-17) 34.70 (18) 
1998 
•  NDLP Phase 2: April 1998 to October 1998. National roll-out. All lone parents making new claims 
for IS (flow claimants) whose youngest child was aged over five years and three months were 
invited to participate in NDLP. Lone parents with children under the age of five years and three 
months did not receive an invitation letter but were able to participate if they wished. 
•  Phase 3:  October 1998 onwards. The full national roll-out of NDLP commenced as Phase 3. 
Invitation letters were sent to all those lone parents whose youngest child is aged over five years 
and three months, who had made a claim for IS prior to April 1998 (stock claimants), as well as 
those making new IS claims (flow claimants). Phase 3 of NDLP was originally actively marketed 
to all lone parents on IS whose youngest child was five years and three months or over (i.e, in full 
time education).  
•  IS rates £17:35 (0-10), £25:35 (11-15), £30:30 (16-18) 
•  FC rates   Basic Rate £48:80, April £12:35 raised to £14:85 in November (0-10) £20.45 (11-15) 
£25.40 (16-18) Applicable amount  £80.65, taper 70% net 
1999 
•  Working Families Tax Credit Basic rate: 52.30 Child rate: £19.85/20.9/25.95 (0-10, 11-15 and 
16-18 years old) Applicable amount £90.00, taper 55% net 
•  IS rates £20:20 (0-10), £25:90 (11-15), £30:95 (16-18) 
2000 
•  NDLP From May 2000, the target group was expanded to include all lone parents with a youngest 
child aged 3 years and over. Lone parents on IS with younger children who asked to join the 
programme were welcome to do so. 
•  WFTC Basic rate:£53.15 Child rate:£25.6(0-15) £26.35(16-18) Applicable amount £91:45 
•  IS rates £26:60 (0-15), £31.75 (16-18)  
2001 
•  WFTC: Basic rate: 59 Child rate: £26 (0-15) £26.75 (16-18) Applicable amount 92:90 
•  IS rates  £32:95 (0-15) £33.75 (16-18) 
April: 
•  Roll-out of Work Focused Interviews WFI: stock lone parents whose youngest child is aged 13-
15. New claimants whose youngest child is aged 5 years 3 months or above  
•  Adviser Discretion Fund introduced in July 2001 discretionary award of up to £300, for use on 
anything which will help a lone parent in finding a job or, if successful, accept a job offer 
November:  
•  NDLP widened to all LPs on low incomes 
2002 
•  WFI: April 2002: stock lone parents whose youngest child is aged 9 -12: new claimants whose 
youngest child is 3 years or above 
•  WFTC: Basic rate: 62.5 Child rate: £26.45 (0-15) £27.20 (16-18) Applicable amount 94:50 
•  IS rates £33:50 (0-15) £34:50 (16-18)   42
 
 
Table 3.  The effect of the reforms on the financial gain to work for parents with children 
Gain to work (£) 
16 hours  35 hours 
 
1997  2001  1997  2001 
Not on HB:         
Lone parent  63  71  107  130 
Primary earner in a couple with 
children  26  50  79  99 
Single person, no children  13  13  72  79 
Second earner in a couple with 
children: no childcare costs, 
first earner on £300 a week 
67  30  127  93 
Lone parent with childcare of 
£50/week when in work:  13  56  92  115 
 
On HB: 
       
Lone parent with HB  43  43  65  80 
         
         
 
 
Notes:  Table measures difference between zero-income benefit income and income after taxes and benefits in 
work. Assumes 2 children under 11 and full take-up of all entitled benefits, hourly wage of £4.20, rent of £50 a 
week where indicates, in-work childcare costs of £50 a week where indicated (slightly more than the average of 
those lone parents currently claiming the Childcare Tax Credit).  All values expressed in 2002 prices.   
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on TAXBEN model. 
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Table 4: Employment Rates of Lone Parents and Matched Samples and Difference-in-Difference Estimates, 1978/80, 1985-87 and 
1991/3 
 
  1978-80  1985-87  1991-93  Change 
1979-86 
Difference  Change 
1986-92 
Difference  Difference 
in 
difference 
Lone parents  .513  .443  .418  -.075 
(-.011) 
-  -.025 
(-.004) 
-  - 
Matched sample 
(all) 
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Table 5 Unconditional Difference in Difference Estimates of Impact of Welfare Reform on Lone Parent Employment Rates
1992 1995 1998 2002




All non-lone parents  73.3 74.1 76.2 77.1 2.900 P value =0 0.900 P value =0 -1.033 P value =0
aged 16-59 (0.483) 0.078 (0.225) 0.000 -(0.258) 0.000




Women in Couples  60.35 63.47 66.39 67.84 6.040 P value =0 1.450 P value = 0 -2.577 P value = 0
with Children (1.007) 0.252 (0.363) 0.010 -(0.644) 0.000
Difference in Difference
N.b. Brackets denote annualised figures
2002-1998 1998-1992  46
 
Table 6 Difference in Difference Estimates of Impact of Welfare Reform on Lone Parent Employment Rates
Comparison with Single Adults without children
1992 1995 1998 2002




Single Women  65.16 66.04 68.62 70.17 3.460 P value =0 1.550 P Value =0 -0.757 P value =0
without Children (0.577) 0.208 (0.387) 0.000 -(0.189) 0.010




Single Without Children  63.25 64 66.13 66.77 2.880 P value =0 0.640 P value = 0 -1.280 P value = 0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.480) 0.102 (0.160) 0.000 -(0.320) 0.000
Difference in Difference
N.b. Brackets denote annualised figures
2002-1998 1998-1992  47
Table 7 Difference in Difference Estimates of Impact of Welfare Reform on Lone Parent Employment Rates by Age of Youngest Child
1992 1995 1998 2002
Ages 0-4




Singles without Children 63.07 63.79 66.54 67.02 3.470 P value =0 0.480 P value =0 -1.833 P value =0
Matched on Lone Parents  (0.578) 0.323 (0.120) 0.001 -(0.458) 0.000
Ages 5-10




Singles without Children 62.22 63.47 65.41 65.96 3.190 P value =0 0.550 P value =0 -1.577 P value =0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.532) 0.198 (0.137) 0.004 -(0.394) 0.046
Ages 11+




Singles without Children 64.6 64.84 66.43 67.37 1.830 P value =0 0.940 P value =0 -0.280 P value =0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.305) 0.273 (0.235) 0.088 -(0.070) 0.012
Difference in Difference
N.b. Brackets denote annualised figures
2002-1998 1998-1992  48
 
Table 8 Difference in Difference Estimates of Impact of Welfare Reform on Lone Parent Employment Rates by Education
1992 1995 1998 2002
O level or Lower




Single Women without Children 56.4 56.21 58.63 56.88 2.230 P value =0 -1.750 P value =0 -3.237 P value =0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.372) 0.018 -(0.438) 0.000 -(0.809) 0.000
A Level and Higher




Single Without Children  74.4 77.42 78.44 78.75 4.040 P value =0 0.310 P value = 0 -2.383 P value = 0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.673) 0.077 (0.078) 0.000 -(0.596) 0.010
Difference in Difference
N.b. Brackets denote annualised figures




Table 10 Difference in Difference Estimates of Impact of Welfare Reform on Lone Parent Employment Rates 16+ hours
1992 1995 1998 2002




Singles Women without Children 63.57 62.92 65.74 67.61 2.170 P value =0 1.870 P value =0 0.423 P value =0
(0.362) 0.323 (0.468) 0.001 (0.106) 0.000




Singles without Children 60.18 60.84 63.27 64.55 3.090 P value =0 1.280 P value =0 -0.780 P value =0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.515) 0.198 (0.320) 0.004 -(0.195) 0.046
Youngest Child Ages Under 5




Singles without Children 60 60.2 63.68 64.8 3.680 P value =0 1.120 P value =0 -1.333 P value =0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.613) 0.273 (0.280) 0.088 -(0.333) 0.012
Difference in Difference
N.b. Brackets denote annualised figures
2002-1998 1998-1992  51




Average Hours of Work 
  1998  2002  Change 
All Lone Parents 
 
11.7  14.2  2.5 
Working Lone Parents 
 
27.3  28.5  1.2 
Working Lone Parents 16+ 
hours 
32.1  30.9  -1.2 
Matched Lone Parents 
1998-2002 
32.0  31.5  -0.5 
Predicted Entrants  -  29.5  - 
Median Weekly Earnings among Lone Parents 
  1998  2002  % Change 
Working Lone Parents 
 
149  203  36.2 
Working Single Women 
without Children 
274  311  13.5 
Working Lone Parents 16+ 
hours 
197  219  11.2 
Matched Lone Parents 
1998-2002 
197  224  13.7 
Predicted Entrants  -  206  - 
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Table A1 Difference in Difference Estimates of Impact of Welfare Reform on Lone Parent Employment Rates by Rental Status
1992 1995 1998 2002
Owners




Single without Children 83.2 84.9 85.9 87.1 2.700 P value =0 1.200 P value =0 -0.600 P value =0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.450) 0.018 (0.300) 0.000 -(0.150) 0.000
Renters




Single Without Children  49.1 46.9 50.1 48.2 1.000 P value =0 -1.900 P value = 0 -2.567 P value = 0
Matched on Lone Parents (0.167) 0.077 -(0.475) 0.000 -(0.642) 0.010
Difference in Difference
N.b. Brackets denote annualised figures
2002-1998 1998-1992  53
Table A2: Characteristics of Lone Parents and Other Comparator Groups in 2002 
 
Share of Group  Lone Parents  Non-Lone Parents  Women in Couples 








Degree  7.3  16.7  13.0  24.3  5.3 
A Level or Equiv.  30.2  37.1  32.5  34.9  29.5 
O Level or Lower  39.1  31.6  40.5  25.8  43.5 
None  23.3  14.7  14.0  15.1  21.4 
Age Group 
16-24  12.5  17.0  17.4  20.5  9.8 
25-35  31.5  23.4  26.3  24.9  29.6 
35-49  50.2  37.2  51.1  26.1  56.3 
50+  5.8  22.4  5.2  28.5  5.3 
Age of Youngest Child 
0-2  18.9  -  22.8  -  - 
3-4  13.8  -  11.8  -  - 
5-10  34.6  -  27.9  -  - 
11+  32.8  -  37.5  -  - 
Housing Tenure  
Owner  35.3  75.8  80.4  51.7  45.6 
Social Sector  50.4  13.2  13.5  19.1  42.8 
Private Renter  13.9  10.6  5.8  28.6  10.8 
Ethnicity  
Black  5.8  1.4  1.1  2.9  5.7 
Asian  2.2  3.1  3.1  1.9  2.2 
Mixed + Other  2.1  2.1  1.5  2.3  2.3   54
   
Table A3: Industry Mix of Lone Parents Working 16+ Hours 
 
  1998  2002 
Production and Construction  30.5  29.4 
Retail and Catering  17.1  20.1 
Other Private Services  15.9  18.8 
Public Administration and Education  16.6  17.0 
Health and other Public Services  29.5  27.5 
  